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Wind shear  has been wi th  us  as long as t h e r e  has been 
wind, bu t  only r e c e n t l y  re-discovered as a l i m i t a t i o n  
t o  f l i g h t .  Early pioneers  of f l i g h t  knew of some of the 
problems of wind shear  effects upon t h e i r  a i r c r a f t .  In  
1896,  a v i a t i o n  pioneer  Ot to  L i l e n t h a l  w a s  k i l l e d  i n  a 
g l i d e r  probably f o r  t h e  same reason modern hang g l i d e r  
p i l o t s  are being k i l l e d ,  t h a t  i s ,  l ack  of l a te ra l  
c o n t r o l  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  handle t h e  tu rbu len t  wind condit ions 
c l o s e  t o  t h e  ground. Recognizing t h i s  problem and 
devis ing a means of l a t e r a l  con t ro l  w a s  probably t h e  
Wright Brothers '  most important con t r ibu t ion  t o  e a r l y  
f l igh t- - and  a l s o  t h e  s u b j e c t  of a b i t t e r  p a t e n t  
infringement s u i t  a g a i n s t  Glenn C u r t i s s  f o r  h i s  use 
of an a i l e r o n .  
Early f l i g h t  manuals t e l l  about t h e  a i r  los ing  i t s  
l i f t ,  a i r  pockets and so f o r t h  t o  desc r ibe  wind shear  
phenomena, but i t  has genera l ly  been regarded f o r  several 
decades t h a t  modern a i rc ra f t  could f l y  through any 
meteorological  phenomenon except poss ib ly  a tornado. 
Educating p i l o t s  and t h e  a v i a t i o n  indus t ry  t o  t h e  cont rary  
has  been our b igges t  problem. 
have m e t  t h e  enemy and he  i s  us". Having heard about t h e  
wind shear  r e l a t e d  acc iden t s  which w e r e  caused by " p i l o t  
e r r o r" ,  w e  have been ill prepared t o  cope with s t rong  wind 
shears  because we  depend upon our a b i l i t y  and s k i l l  t o  
manipulate a i rcraf t  and do no t  e a s i l y  admit w e  could make 
I n  Pogo terminology "we 




When I f i r s t  described how an a i r c r a f t  could h i t  
shor t  i n  a decreasing tai lwind shear (1969), published 
meteorological l i t e r a t u r e  a t  the time expressed the  
conclusion t h a t  the  s t rongest  probable wind shears w e r e  
on the  order of 10  knots p e r  100 f e e t  v e r t i c a l  t r ave l .  
Meteorologists s t i l l  c a l l  t h i s  v e r t i c a l  wind shear which 
the  engineer and student  of f l u i d  dynamics c a l l s  
hor izonta l  wind shear .  W e  don' t  even have a common 
language--which brings us t o  the  p i l o t ' s  second most 
pressing problem--the need f o r  a language t o  discuss 
wind shear encounters with o ther  p i l o t s  so  t h a t  the  
react ion of the  a i r c r a f t  t o  the  wind shear encounter can 
be accurately described without expecting a l l  p i l o t s  t o  
be experts  i n  wind shear analys is .  For severa l  years 
I have been suggesting the  use of pos i t i ve  and negative 
shear as follows: 
Pos i t ive  Shear: A shear which r e s u l t s  i n  the  
a i r c r a f t  having a tendency t o  
increase airspeed and/or overfly 
the  gl idepath.  
a i r c r a f t  having a tendency t o  
decrease airspeed and/or underfly 
the  gl idepath.  
Negative Shear: A shear which r e s u l t s  i n  the  
These def in i t ions  a r e  important, I th ink,  because 
report ing a decreasing tai lwind shear o r  a tai lwind t o  
headwind shear does not  accurately describe the  react ion 
i n  a l l  cases and requires i n t e rp re t a t i on .  As I have 
consis tent ly  pointed ou t ,  a decreasing tai lwind which i s  
always a decreasing tai lwind can change from a pos i t ive  
e f f e c t  t o  a negative e f f e c t  i f  the  p i l o t  corrects  f o r  the  
rate of encounter and i f  the  ra te  of encounter subsequently 
decreases,  (See Figure 1). I n  t h i s  case i f  "wind shear" 
i s  simply reported,  a following p i l o t  could i n t e rp re t  
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t h e  p o s i t i v e  effect as t h e  only e f f e c t  and be even more 
unaware than i f  he heard no r e p o r t  a t  a l l .  
i n  t h i s  case such as "a p o s i t i v e  shear  a t  t h e  ou te r  
marker with a moderate nega t ive  shear  a t  t h e  middle 
marker" would accura te ly  desc r ibe  t o  a fol lowing p i l o t  
what t o  expect .  This type effect usua l ly  i s  encountered 
i n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  such as t h a t  which caused t h e  I b e r i a  
DC-10 t o  c rash  a t  Boston, t h a t  i s ,  s h o r t l y  a f te r  a cold  
f r o n t  has passed the a i r p o r t  so t h a t  most of  t h e  approach 
i s  done wi th  a decreasing t a i lwind  a l o f t .  For p o s i t i v e  
shears  which occur a l l  t h e  way t o  t h e  ground, i t  i s  
important t h a t  fol lowing p i l o t s  are aware of  t h e  type 
effect  they are expected t o  dea l  wi th .  
are l i k e l y  t o  add fa r  too much speed t o  complete a 
success fu l  landing.  
A r e p o r t  
Otherwise they 
XL i  
1
Figure  1 
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CAUTION! Shears associated with thunderstorm down- 
d r a f t s  are l i k e l y  t o  cause p i l o t s  t o  repor t  s trong pos i t i ve  
shears which w i l l  become strong negative shears as a 
thunderstorm downdraft moves from the  f a r  end t o  the  
approach end of t he  runway. 
only with t h e  f ron t  s i d e  of the  downdraft base area s ince  
the  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  be on the  ground before passing through 
the  base area (See Figure 2 ) .  All wind shears which 
are associated with thunderstorms should be considered 
as having the  po ten t i a l  f o r  severe negative react ion 
regardless of how they are reported.  
I n i t i a l  enounters w i l l  be 
Figure 2 
178 
It appears a t  present  t h a t  the  severe downdraft o r  
downburst, as named by D r .  F u j i t a ,  i s  very rare.  They 
apparently can come from s m a l l  thunderstorms as well 
as l a rge  ones, but i n  both cases the  c e l l s  must have rap id  
development. This presents  a real problem t o  p i l o t s .  
W e  have a l l  flown beneath thunderstorms with very l i t t l e  
adverse e f f e c t .  In  f a c t ,  t h i s  w a s  recommended when I 
went through f l i g h t  t r a in ing .  Downbursts are rare and 
unpredictable,  and p i l o t s  want t o  complete t h e i r  mission. 
Adequate t r a in ing  and communication between p i l o t s  could 
help avoid some downburst accidents s ince  there  has usual ly  
been some evidence t o  preceding p i l o t s  before the  accident 
o r  inc iden t ,  
can reduce a p i l o t ' s  recognit ion and react ion t i m e ,  only 
a r e fusa l  t o  f l y  though the  area w i l l  guarantee s a fe ty  
s ince  no commercial a i r c r a f t  ,in the  takeoff o r  landing 
configuration can adequately cope with an encounter of the  
base area of a downburst with outflowing winds on the  order  
of 60 knots o r  more. Out bes t  b e t  now, t h a t  i s  immediately 
a t t a inab le ,  i s  a network of anemometers along the  
a r r i v a l  and departure routes t o  an a i r p o r t  with an 
automatic monitor t o  s igna l  any gross deviat ion of wind 
condition t o  tower con t ro l le r s  so  they can take appropriate 
ac t ion.  
Although a warning of severe wind shear 
D r .  Fernando Caraceno, atmospheric phys ic i s t  a t  N O M ,  
a l s o  suggests measuring pressure and temperature t o  
determine these areas of s ign i f i can t  deviat ion.  
I n  t r a in ing  p i l o t s  w e  must make them aware of the  
f a c t  t h a t  t he re  must be i n d r t i a l  accelera t ion of the  a i r c r a f t  
t o  cor rec t  for a negative shear ,  and t h a t  t h i s  accelera t ion 
which they f e e l  can cause them t o  under react t o  the  shear .  
I n  a l l  cases when they de tec t  a strong negative shear  
condition c lose  t o  the  ground they should advance f u l l  
t h rus t  and prepare f o r  a go around i f  necessary. 
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I n c i d e n t a l l y  several instrument systems and a u t o p i l o t /  
a u t o t h r o t t l e  systems use  long i tud ina l  accelerometers t o  
modulate t h e  response rate,  which means t h a t  f o r  normal 
condi t ions when t h e  a i r c r a f t  has long i tud ina l  a c c e l e r a t i o n ,  
t h e  response rate is  re ta rded .  
shear  condi t ion  through where long i tud ina l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  
i s  requi red  and t h e  response ra te  needs t o  be increased ,  
i t  w i l l  i n s t e a d  be decreased f o r  these  systems. This 
i s  one reason why a w e l l  t r a i n e d  p i l o t  can bea t  the 
automatic system. A l so ,  it  i s  t h e  reason why a p o t e n t i a l  
f l i g h t  path instrument o r  d i sp lay  w i l l  n o t  work i n  a 
wind shea r .  
a centered p i t c h  command f o r  a given angular d isp lace-  
ment from t h e  g l i d e  s lope .  What may be s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  
normal condi t ions may be  inadequate f o r  s t rong  wind shear  
condi t ions .  I have objec ted  t o  t h e  use  of t h i s  as 
p i t c h  command s i n c e  I f i r s t  s a w  one. They should i n s t e a d  
be c a l l e d  f l i g h t  path command and should n o t  cen te r  
unless  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  a c t u a l l y  co r rec t ing  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  
pa th .  
This opens t h e  whole arena of a i r c r a f t  instrumentat ion.  
Basic t o  our  p resen t  problem i s  t h a t  our primary instrument ,  
t h e  a t t i t u d e  ind ica to r ,does  n o t  t e l l  us where w e  are 
going relat ive t o  t h e  horizon.  The p i l o t  must i n t e g r a t e  
i n t o  h i s  th inking  t h e  descent  ra te  and g l i d e  pa th  
p o s i t i o n  t o  determine where he  i s  going. However, under 
good v i s u a l  condi t ions he has i n s t a n t  recogni t ion  of where 
he  i s  going because he sees t h e  a i rcragt ' s  t r a j e c t o r y ,  
terminat ing a t  t h a t  po in t  on t h e  rcnway t h a t  doesn ' t  move. 
Limitat ions t o  a p i l o t ' s  recogni t ion  of a hazardous 
s i t u a t i o n  which are inherent  t o  h i s  instrument  system and 
opera t iona l  procedures may be  t h e  determining f a c t o r  i n  
many acc iden t s .  
In a s t rong  negat ive  
Another problem i s  t h e  f l i g h t  d i r e c t o r  which gives 
One recen t  a i d  has been t h e  Ground 
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Proximity Warning System (GPWS) . Even though p i l o t s  are 
genera l ly  annoyed a t  t h e  false warnings,  t h i s  warning of 
g l i d e  p a t h  depar ture  may be  t h e  p i l o t ' s  f i r s t  c l u e  t o  a 
d e t e r i o r a t i n g  s i t u a t i o n .  The GPWS i s  a band a i d  approach 
though. With b e t t e r  instrument systems we would be aware 
of a d e t e r i o r a t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  before t h e  GPWS t o l d  us  about i t .  
A s p e c i a l  problem i n  p i l o t  r ecogn i t ion  t i m e  occurs 
when t h e  a u t o- p i l o t  inc reases  t h e  a i rc ra f t ' s  p i t c h  c l o s e  t o  
t h e  ground. While t h e  p i t c h  i s  inc reas ing ,  t h e  p i l o t ' s  
normal c i s u a l  cue t h a t  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  go in t  t o  h i t  
s h o r t  is obscured because he  does n o t  observe t h e  runway 
r ise  i n  h i s  f i e l d  of v i e w .  If h e  i s  n o t  aware of t h e  
condi t ion  and e s p e c i a l l y  i f  he has j u s t  t r a n s i t i o n e d  from 
a heads down instrument  approach t o  a heads up v i s u a l  
landing,  h e  w i l l  be  several seconds la te  i n  recognizing h i s  
predicament. Even though i n  some wind shear  acc idents  i t  
can be proved t h e o r e t i c a l l y  t h a t  t h e  a i rc ra f t  could have 
made a success fu l  landing o r  go around, we must consider  t h e  
e n t i r e  system which inc ludes  t h e  p i l o t .  H i s  recongni t ion  
and r e a c t i o n  t i m e s  are o f t e n  t h e  c r u c i a l  element. By t r a i n -  
ing  we  can reduce t h e  r ecogn i t ion  t i m e  somewhat, but wi th  
b e t t e r  ins t rumenta t ion  d i sp lays  w e  could cut t h e  recogni t ion  
t i m e  t o  a minimum. 
Related t o  t h e  instrument system i s  t h e  method of 
f l i g h t  con t ro l .  Approach couplers  u t i l i z e  a method of 
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  whereby p i t c h  changes are used t o  c o r r e c t  f o r  
e r r o r s  i n  f l i g h t  pa th  p o s i t i o n  and r e s u l t a n t  changes i n  a i r-  
speed are expected t o  be co r rec ted  f o r  with t h r u s t .  
d i r e c t o r s  command t h i s  type response.  Aside form t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  magnitudes of p i t c h  co r rec t ion  which are s u i t a b l e  f o r  
s t a b l e  wind condit ions are n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  wind%shear  
condi t ions ,  t h e r e  i s  a s e r i o u s  c o n f l i c t  with aerodynamic 
theory- -par t ly  recongized i n  some l a t e  model systems which 
have coordinated inputs  t o  p i t c h  and t h r u s t .  To change t h e  
F l i g h t  
181 
direction of an a i r c r a f t ' s  i n e r t i a l  vector requires 
centr ipetal  force supplied a t  a change i n  l i f t .  An 
increase i n  l i f t  i s  accompanied by an increase i n  
induced drag which i f  not immediately o f f se t  by thrus t  
means a decrease i n  airspeed w i l l  r e s u l t .  
t o  f l y  a less  negative f l i g h t  path angle requires a def in i te  
amount of thrus t  increase. Thus for  a known thrus t  
def ic ient  condition where the a i r c r a f t  i s  going below the 
gl ide slope, th rus t  must be added along with a change i n  
pi tch.  However, except for  the br ief  application of 
cent r ipe ta l  force requiring a momentary increase i n  angle 
of a t tack ,  the ne t  r e s u l t  of the pi tch change is t o  
maintain a constant angle of a t tack,  while the change i n  
thrust  i s  the major contributor t o  a new f l i g h t  path. 
o l d  r u l e  "Attitude plus power equals performance'' i s  as 
correct  today as when I went through navy f l i g h t  t ra ining.  
Those who explain t o  themselves and others the 
e f fec ts  of wind shear based on an assumption of ins tant-  
aneous change i n  airspeed. Their view imposes an assumption 
tha t  a change i n  airspeed i s  the f i r s t  observable e f fec t  
of a shear,  and of course they argue fo r  a thrus t  correction 
t o  r e c t i f y  the s i tua t ion .  
ever causes the p i l o t  t o  f i r s t  observe a thrus t  def ic ient  
condition should cause immediate corrective action.  However, 
i n  a negative shear condition of a reasonably f i n i t e  r a t e ,  
an a i r c r a f t  with posi t ive  longitudinal s t a b i l i t y  w i l l  of 
i t s  own accord pi tch over t o  maintain i t s  trimmed airspeed. 
Only a f t e r  the  a i r c r a f t  departs from the g l ide  slope w i l l  
the autopilot  (or p i l o t )  exer t  an elevator input which 
w i l l  cause an airspeed decrease. The def ic ient  thrus t  
condition should be recognized before the airspeed 
decrease, 
In  addit ion,  
The 
I cer ta inly agree tha t  what- 
but again i f  the airspeed decrease 
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i s  the  p i l o t ' s  f i r s t  observation of the  condit ion,  
he should ce r t a in ly  respond. 
condition w i l l  respond with t h rus t  and p i t c h ,  but  t he  
au top i lo t  responds only with p i tch .  The p i l o t  then must 
i n t e r p r e t  the  au top i lo t  response before adding t h r u s t .  
This i s  a ser ious  l imi t a t i on  of auto coupler approaches, 
and f l i g h t  d i r ec to r  approaches i f  p i t ch  command i s  used 
as an ac t ion  uncoordinated with t h r u s t .  
p i l o t s  coordinate the  two and have learned t o  an t i c ipa t e  
the  approach coupler,  but  unfortunately some have used 
the  uncoordinated act ion of the  approach coupler t o  
argue a fa l l ac ious  method of f l i g h t  control  t h a t  can only 
be demonstrated by uncoordinated ac t ion .  
f a c t  is  t h a t  they want t o  force  beginning instrument f l i g h t  
students t o  adopt t h e i r  uncoordinated method. An energy 
t rade  i s  a more rapid response than a th rus t  change so  
they get  deeper i n t o  t h e i r  problem by forcing an energy 
t rade  before a t h rus t  response. Indeed a c e r t a i n  
amount of energy t rade  w i l l  occur but  a p i l o t  content 
with uncoordinated act ion w i l l  be very l a te  i n  responding 
with t h r u s t  i n  a s t rong wind shear.  
t r ade  should be reserved f o r  d r a s t i c  conditions which i s  
the  reason f o r  carrying ex t r a  airspeed.  
traded can be used a t  any t i m e ,  but t h rus t  not  applied 
i s  l o s t  forever .  
Since a l a rge  p a r t  of what we  think w e  know about 
A competent p i l o t  upon sensing a t h r u s t  de f i c i en t  
Fortunately most 
The alarming 
An in t en t iona l  energy 
Energy not  
wind shear  effects upon a i r c r a f t  has come from review of 
p a s t  accidents  and inc iden ts ,  w e  should be ca re fu l  in  
reviewing the  data .  
w e r e  being used which means t h a t  t o  determine the  magni- 
tude of a shear a t h r u s t  level must be assumed. Since the  
Ai r l ine  P i l o t  Association general ly bel ieves  t he  p i l o t s  w e r e  
t e l l i n g  the  t r u t h ,  we  usual ly  come up with l a rge r  shear  values 
I n  most cases 4 channel f l i g h t  recorders 
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than o t h e r  parties who want t o  make assumptions of lesser 
t h r u s t  levels. In some cases ,  t o  come up w i t h  a modest 
shear  o r  none a t  a l l ,  t h e  p i l o t s  would have t o  have 
s e l e c t e d  reverse t h r u s t  whi le  t h e  a i rcraf t  w a s  several 
hundred feet i n  t h e  a i r .  W e  be l i eve  t h a t  most hard 
landings have been caused by wind shea r  and t h a t  t h e  
problem has been fa r  g r e a t e r  than formerly suspected.  
The most important s a f e t y  hedge t h e  p i l o t  has had 
t o  p r o t e c t  himself from an adverse encounter with wind 
shear  has been t h e  pad of a i r speed  he puts  on f o r  "Mama 
and t h e  Kids". 
acc idents  have been avoided by p i l o t s '  good judgement 
i n  t h i s  matter .  Extra a i r speed  i s  a double edged sword 
though--the e x t r a  energy which i s  s o  important i n  
p ro tec t ing  a g a i n s t  a s t rong  negat ive  shea r  encounter can 
severe ly  l i m i t  t h e  s topping c a p a b i l i t y  wi th  a p o s i t i v e  
shea r  encounter.  
I be l i eve  t h a t  many p o t e n t i a l  wind shea r  
The e f f e c t  of runway over run acc idents  upon 
approach procedures must be examined and put  i n  t h e i r  
proper context .  For many years  t h e  indus t ry  has n o t  
recognized a very important f a c t o r  i n  runway over runs. 
I n  most cases t h e  a i r c r a f t  touched down long and f a s t ,  
usua l ly  due t o  wind s h e a r .  
been quick t o  l a b e l  t h i s  as p i l o t  e r r o r .  They argue 
t h a t  i f  the  a i rc ra f t  hadn ' t  landed long and f a s t  t h e  
acc ident  wouldn't  have occurred. However, i n  almost a l l  
cases i f  t h e  s topping c a p a b i l i t y  a f t e r  t h e  touchdown 
had been what t h e  p i l o t  w a s  accustomed t o  having t h e  
acc ident  a l s o  would n o t  have occurred. The important 
po in t  t h a t  has been s o  o f t e n  overlooked i s  t h a t  the 
p i l o t s  almost i n v a r i a b l y  w e r e  aware of t h e i r  long fast 
touchdown and be l ieved they could s t o p  the  a i r c r a f t .  
Since a l l  such previous acc idents  occurred from 
" p i l o t  e r r o r"  r a t h e r  than inadequate s topping c a p a b i l i t y ,  
So c a l l e d  s a f e t y  exper ts  have 
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p i l o t s  have been unprepared t o  cope with t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n .  
revers ion,  with w a t e r  inges t ion i n t o  engines causing loss  
of reverse t h rus t  o r  a number of o ther  f ac to r s  which 
rapidly  compound, the  s i t u a t i o n  can grow i n t o  one he 
may be incapable of handling. The point  though i s  t h a t  
ins tead  of recognizing the  ser ious  l imi ta t ions  of 
stopping under adverse condit ions,  educating the  p i l o t s  
and correct ing the  runway f r i c t i o n  problem by grooving, 
the  s i m p l e  so lu t ion  has been t o  i n s i s t  on using low 
approach speeds. Now I ce r t a in ly  don ' t  approve of 
a r b i t r a r i l y  adding speed increments when the  need doesn' t  
e x i s t  nor do I approve of long f a s t  touchdowns, but I am 
very much against  the  in t imidat ion of p i l o t s  t o  not use 
the  speed required f o r  the  ex i s t i ng  condition. 
p i l o t s  w i l l  continue t o  exerc ise  good judgement and add 
e x t r a  speed i n  turbulent  conditions desp i te  in t imidat ion 
by those more i n t e r e s t ed  i n  proving t h e i r  p a s t  act ions 
have been cor rec t  than i n  s a f e  operating procedures. 
I f  s o ,  the re  should continue t o  be cases of p i l o t s  being 
high and f a s t  over the  threshold.  However, with proper  
appreciat ion of the  stopping problem, such cases should 
r e s u l t  i n  go arounds ins tead of over runs. The r u l e  of 
adding one ha l f  the  steady wind plus a l l  of the  gusts  i s  
inadequate f o r  wind conditions d i f f e r e n t  than observed 
by the  tower, but  some i n  the  industry want t o  r i g i d l y  
l i m i t  a p i l o t ' s  judgement by t h i s  r u l e .  To do so  runs the  
r i s k  of causing more approach accidents  sho r t  of the  runway. 
Although the  r u l e  i s  general ly a good one i t  should not  
be used t o  l i m i t  p i l o t  judgement of the  ac tua l  condition 
which may be t o t a l l y  i r r e l evan t  t o  the  ground reported wind. 
When a p i l o t  gets  h i s  f i r s t  case of rubber t read 
I hope 
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Recent emphasis has centered i n  downburs ts  r e l a t ed  
wind shear ,  but o ther  types should not be disregarded. 
Many p i l o t s  s t i l l  do not  know what t o  expect when a 
f ron t  l i e s  c lose  t o  an a i r p o r t ,  and the  low level o r  
nocturnal  j e t  stream i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  unknown. 
TN- D- 6430 ,  1971) describes how a s t rong increasing head- 
wind could exc i t e  the  phugoid o s c i l l a t i o n  of some a i r c r a f t .  
It i s  a known f a c t  t h a t  some j e t  upsets occurred while 
encountering s t rong increas ing headwinds. 
needs t o  be devoted t o  t h i s  area and i f  a hazard e x i s t s ,  
p i l o t s  need t o  be informed. 
I n  several downdraft r e l a t e d  wind shear accidents  
and incidents  we have been a b l e  t o  produce WSR-57 radar  
p ic tu res  of the  thunderstorm c e l l  t h a t  caused the  accident 
o r  inc iden t ,  ye t  t h a t  v i t a l  information which w a s  recorded 
a t  t he  t i m e  w a s  unavailable t o  the  f l i g h t  crews f ly ing  
beneath the  c e l l s .  
Joe Gera of NASA Langley, i n  h i s  paper (NASA 
More study 
I f  we a r e  t o  have s a f e  operations without unduly 
l imi t ing them, w e  must be t ter  develop our information 
gathering and knowledge of wind shear .  There i s  a r i s k  
of operation of anything t h a t  moves and our job i s  
of ten  one of r i s k  assessment. J u s t  as many fac tors  come 
together  i n  precise  focus t o  cause an accident ,  the  
absence of a s ing l e  one can make the  di f ference between 
a f a t a l  accident and a good s to ry .  
with s ing l e  solut ions  as there  are no panaceas. W e  need 
t o  unload as many chambers as quickly as possible before 
the  hammer f a l l s  again on the  proper combination. 
W e  must not be content 
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